BUNCEFIELD OIL DEPOT FIRE
AT 0602 HOURS ON SUNDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2005 Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service Control Center received the first of more than 60 calls to an incident at the Buncefield Oil Depot. Other surrounding control centers received another 150 calls. The officer-in-charge declared a "major incident" after just eight minutes of being on the scene.
The massive explosion at the oil depot was heard some 200 miles (322 kilometers) away. The blast blew windows out of homes 2 miles (3 kilometers) away and devastated the surrounding industrial area including the total or partial collapse of numerous commercial buildings, which during the working week would have been occupied by several thousand workers. Although 43 people were hurt in the explosion, no one was seriously injured or lost their life. The most seriously injured individual spent just over two days in the hospital recovering.
The initial crews were confronted with a scene of unprecedented destruction covering several square kilometers, which has been described as the largest incident of its kind in peacetime Europe. Aside from setting fire to the oil storage tanks and causing the devastation, the blast destroyed the oil depot control center, the emergency water supply pump houses, and completely obstructed perimeter roads. The intensity of the fires meant that two of the three emergency open-water supplies were inaccessible.
The pre-planning for this site followed national guidelines and focused on the largest single tank involved in fire, with foam concentrate, emergency water supplies, and foam making equipment stored on site for immediate use by local crews. Hertfordshire crews had trained at the site using this equipment on six occasions in the last six months. On arrival, fire fighters found 20 tanks ablaze and flames were leaping 200 feet (60 meters) into the air. The thick black plume of smoke created a gigantic cloud that was easily visible on satellite pictures. The plume initially moved in a southeasterly direction from the site.
At 0720, Deputy Chief Fire Officer Mark Yates went to the scene and following a briefing took command at 0747. Over the next five days, the five Hertfordshire Principal Officers rotated the command to ensure there was always one of them at both Gold Command and the incident.Hertfordshire Resilience, which was first established as Hertfordshire Emergency Services Major Incident Committee (HESMIC) 30 years ago to facilitate multi-agency emergency planning, set up Gold Command at Hertfordshire Police's headquarters.
I attended Gold Command within the first hour of the incident. The UK emergency services and partner agencies operate a Gold, Silver, and Bronze command structure. This equates to strategic or Gold (usually away from the incident), tactical of Silver (usually command units at the scene) and operational or Bronze (frontline fire fighting or rescue). The first Police Gold meeting was held at 0800 and the first multi-agency meeting was at 0900. Gold continued to meet until the night of Thursday, December 14.
Fight the fire
The incident had to be dealt within a number of phases. First, the Incident Commander called for search-and-rescue operations in the numerous collapsed and damaged buildings in the surrounding district. A three-story office complex adjacent to the oil depot was on fire because of the blast. This necessitated eight fire engines and one aerial appliance to stay on site while the search-and-rescue operations were being conducted. At this early stage, the oil depot was considered as one sector with numerous ancillary buildings having to be searched for casualties and then water-cooling curtains being set up to protect the tanks that were not involved in fire. It was not until four days later that all persons could be finally accounted for.
Gold Command immediately started discussing the health and environmental issues surrounding the fire, including smoke-plume modeling. At one stage, this computer-based technology suggested that the smoke plume would have reached the European mainland, including France, Belgium and Luxembourg, within 24 hours.
The amount of smoke contributed to the Gold Command discussing whether to attempt to extinguish the fire or allow burning down. Health advice to residents was to "go indoors, stay in and tune in to local radio and TV announcements." The possible pollution health effects also led to the closure of 250 schools for 2 days.
This effect, the possibility that the fires could burn for up to 9 days, the effect on northern Europe and the image of the fire service not tackling a fire of this size led to the decision to actively fight the fire. Following this decision, Gold Command identified and ordered bulk foam concentrate supplies and high-volume pumps, as it was apparent that a fire of this nature was well beyond even the regional resources available. The high-volume pumps have been provided to Fire and Rescue Services via central government as part of the national resilience program.