In the wake of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the American government acted quickly to mobilize what it called "critical homeland defenders" to meet the threat faced by our nation and the world. Not surprisingly, 21 government agencies made the list, ranging from the State Department to the U.S. Border Patrol.
That may be what it takes to address the immediate crisis. But for the long-term preservation and expansion of democratic freedom, the United States must look to public schools--the one institution founded to transmit civic principles and virtues from one generation to the next. Public schools must not only be added to the list, they should be moved up to the top as America's most important homeland defender.
Before 9/11, civic education was taken for granted or treated as an afterthought in many school districts. Renewing the civic mission of public schools wasn't high on America's educational agenda--even as evidence mounted that growing numbers of young Americans were uninformed about democratic principles, disengaged from the political process, distrusting of government and uninterested in working for the common good. But the wake-up call on 9/11 reminded many Americans, including many school leaders, of the vital link between democracy and public education.
Predictably, some of the response has been superficial, even jingoistic, as lawmakers from New York to California rushed to restore patriotic exercises to the classroom. Most educators, however, understand that there is no quick fix. As detailed in a groundbreaking 2002 report entitled "The Civic Mission of Schools," educating for citizenship in our democracy will require that schools provide students with more instruction in history and constitutional principles, more discussions about public policy issues and more opportunities for civic engagement through service learning and school governance.
Practicing Democracy
At the First Amendment Center, we share this vision for public schools as laboratories for democracy and freedom. That's why we joined with the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development in March 2001 to sponsor a project called "First Amendment Schools: Educating for Freedom and Responsibility," a national reform initiative designed to help schools teach and practice democratic principles throughout the community.
At a First Amendment School, students and all members of the school community are given meaningful opportunities to practice democracy; students learn how to exercise their individual rights with responsibility and experience what it feels like to serve the common good; parents, students and educators work together to help shape the school culture; and civic education is translated into civic engagement through service learning and civic problem solving.
Over the last two years, we've had the chance to work closely with the first 11 First Amendment Project Schools through site visits, telephone interviews, leadership conferences and progress reports. As the schools complete their second year (of a three-year grant cycle), all 11 provide case studies for how public schools can work to become laboratories of democracy by carrying out their civic mission and maintaining a strong commitment to high academic achievement. Here's a brief look at three of those schools.
* Case Study 1: Nursery Road Elementary School, Columbia, S.C.
Nursery Road, a public elementary school, opened in 1980 to accommodate a growing student population in the Lexington, S.C., School District 5. It is a diverse community despite its compact attendance zone. Many of the teachers who opened the building remain.
In its First Amendment School action plans, Nursery Road identified three primary goals: engaging all members of the community in implementation; providing all students with grade-level appropriate activities that teach, model and reinforce the value of democratic citizenship; and reinstating student government that represents all students and offers them opportunities to practice democratic citizenship.
During a site visit, it was apparent that Nursery Road placed a high value on ceremony. At a schoolwide assembly, students entered holding the flags of every country represented in the community. The choirs sang patriotic songs, the children dressed as historical figures, and the school constructed a giant American flag made entirely of cup cakes.
During a second visit to the school at the end of the school year, we listened as teachers described a much meatier course of study. "I was in shock when 1 first heard about this project," said one 3rd-grade teacher. "My first thought was, 'This can't work at an elementary school.' But," she continued, "this project is one of the best things we've done at Nursery Road. I see how fundamental it is to our role as educators and as citizens."
"Now when my kids say the First Amendment," said another teacher, "they actually know what it means. It's so exciting to see how much they've internalized it."

In the peak week of the pandemic (week 4), from 15% to 34% of all hospital beds would be required for patients with influenza (Table). The upper end of impact on hospital beds at >40% would occur for Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, and Tonga. Assuming all consultations required doctors, 42 to 99 influenza consultations per doctor would be required during the peak week (Table). The upper end of impact on consultations for individual Pacific island countries and areas would vary from 31 (New Caledonia) to 524 (Vanuatu); Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu would have rates >150 consultations per week.
The uncertainties associated with pandemic influenza mean that any modeling of its future impact is relatively crude. For example, the new strain may be particularly infectious, virulent, or both. In contrast, the use of international-level public health interventions as recommended by WHO (9) may prevent pandemic influenza from reaching some Pacific Island countries and areas or particularly remote island groups. These issues and other limitations with the model are detailed in the online Appendix.
Nevertheless, if the death rate is in the range suggested by the model, this outcome would make it the worst internal demographic event since the 1918 influenza pandemic for many Pacific Island countries and areas. The lower death rate (albeit for a single wave) is similar to the U.S. rates for the 1957 influenza pandemic (22 per 100,000) and the 1968 influenza pandemic (14 per 100,000) (10). The upper end is considerably lower than for the 1918 pandemic, which suggests that the range indicated is reasonably plausible. Although relatively high, the death toll from pandemic influenza would still be less than the typical annual impact for some Pacific Island countries and areas from other infectious diseases (including malaria and diarrheal diseases) and from such fundamental determinants of health status such as poor sanitation, poor diet, and tobacco use.
The predicted range of hospitalizations attributable to pandemic influenza would likely overwhelm hospital capacity in many of the Pacific Island countries and areas. Rapid response at the onset of the pandemic could ensure efficacious use of hospital beds and resources, e.g., cancel elective procedures and early discharge to community care. Other contingency plans by hospitals could facilitate lower hospital admission rates (e.g., strengthening the primary care response).
Planning and capacity building could be provided by WHO, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, and donor nations and agencies with support for improving surveillance and other preventive measures for disease control (see the online Appendix for details). A combination of national capacity building with international support will maximize the capacity to respond to the next influenza pandemic as well as other potential communicable disease threats.

Although we agree with several of the cautions made in the Autumn 2004 Parameters article by George Reed, Craig Bullis, Ruth Collins, and Christopher Paparone, "Mapping the Route of Leadership Education: Caution Ahead," a moratorium on competency modeling seems unwarranted. Core competencies can help align parts of an organization to a central purpose. In contemporary operations, organizational core competencies can help leaders prioritize decisions and focus on enduring goals.
The five military services all use competency models. Within the US Army, competencies are an established part of doctrine. The Army operates with two core competencies, as outlined in its 2004 Posture Statement. Field Manuals (FM) 7-0 and 7-1 require competency-based leader development. Competency models have been developed by various agencies, including the Army War College, and recent work by the US Army Research Institute has led to a new set being considered for an update to FM 22-100.
Some studies report that up to 80 percent of businesses use competency modeling (see Schippmann et al., 2000, for a review of competency modeling practices). The federal government uses competencies, and in just one application the Office of Personnel Management has claimed a savings of $10 million over traditional approaches to personnel management and development Putting aside for a moment the notion of competency, the expectations of Army leaders must somehow be identified--no matter what label is used for the requirements. Every Army educational institution has some mechanism in place to specify learning objectives and course content. The top complaints from soldiers and leaders have been the duplication in lessons across Army courses and schools, and the material coming later than it was needed to prepare them for their jobs (US Army Combined Arms Center, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003). Having a coordinated set of requirements seems central to improving Army education.
The authors indicated that a detailed competency model could result in education that is contrary to what is needed, but competency models attempt to avoid overspecification. A primary advantage of competency modeling over traditional job analysis is that competency models state requirements in terms of the person rather than the job. Thus, the focus is placed squarely on developing people, which is important for an organization in which all senior leaders are promoted from within. Competencies should not constrain education, but help to clarify desired educational outcomes and other means of development.
The examples (e.g., adaptability, creativity, public speaking) noted in Reed et al. are commonly construed elsewhere to be competencies. Reed et al. stated that these activities need not be identified in a competencies list because the set should be subject to continual change. However, competency models can and should be verified and revised through actual use, regular assessment, and refinements applied to leader development. Even if requirements like adaptability, creativity, and communication are not listed in a competency framework, there still would be some source for instructional content. Additionally, the authors' proposed model of curriculum development is not all that different from competency modeling.
As Reed et al. noted, a good teacher can overcome a poor curriculum. Thus, good teachers will not be constrained by competency lists. For instructors who are less experienced, however, scientifically validated competency models can help provide structure, guidance, and tools for teaching. Starting from a common competency model can elevate instructional quality by helping teachers to develop a consistent approach. Incorporating validated concepts and evidence into instruction should help convey a complete picture of what is required of Army leaders. Instructors operating in good faith can be expected to use educational requirements to improve teaching, not restrict it. In addition to educational benefits, competencies have a wide variety of other uses, such as coordinating leader development across ranks. Competencies also offer benefits for leader assessment, assignment management, and organizational communication.
As scientists we understand that there are valid perspectives other than competencies that can contribute to the identification of leadership requirements. However, one advantage of a scientific approach is that methods and results are documented and can be verified or disconfirmed. It is not clear what alternative method Reed et al. have in mind for identifying leadership requirements. Without some form of a competency list or some type of specification of the performance domain, it is unclear how the authors are suggesting that leadership will be observed in operational circumstances and developed.
In addition we would like to mention these additional four concerns:
* The lineage of competency mapping is arguably not trait-based. Competency modeling stems, in part, from David McClelland's observation that intelligence tests are insufficient predictors of high job performance. McClelland used criterion-referenced behavioral tests that were not trait-oriented. Although some competency models incorporate traits along with knowledge-skills-abilities, traits are not an essential component of competency models.

MONTE CARLO -- Hurricane Katrina tore ashore in late August with such fury that the insurance industry was unable to keep up with exactly how much damage she had done.
Two weeks after the storm wreaked havoc on Gulf Coast communities and oil platforms offshore, carriers, reinsurers and modeling vendors were still scrambling to update their original loss estimates.
And that has some people wondering just how accurate some of the models are, and whether catastrophe models themselves should be candidates for a downgrade or two of sorts.
"The impact on modeling will be big," said Henry Keeling, CEO of reinsurance operations of XL Capital. "Blind interpretation of models will be questioned."
He also said that many capital-markets companies that relied on insurance industry models before developing catastrophe risk products for investors may "pause a bit," and even turn away from selling such products altogetherIt clearly causes a rethinking in the way we sell products and the way we price the product," said Jamie Veghte, CEO of XL Re America Inc.
Among the capital-markets players invested in catastrophe risk products are hedge funds. Managers who run these funds will now begin to reconsider the models used to make their investment decisions, analysts with Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's said.
"Katrina will cause a rethinking of catastrophe models," said Ted Collins, group managing director of global insurance for Moody's. "For the hedge funds, that's a question they will be asking themselves.
By mid-September, many carriers, reinsurers and modeling firms had revised their loss estimates, and few expected even those revisions would stand once the flood waters began to recede and adjusters were allowed to survey the wreckage to policyholders' homes and businesses.
The world's largest reinsurer, Munich Re, for example, withdrew its initial loss estimate of $500 million when it became clear that the damage would far exceed it. Days later, on Sept. 12, Swiss Re announced it would double its $500 million loss estimate to $1.2 billion.
Modeling vendors were even busier in the wake of the hurricane. Risk Management Solutions Inc., which first announced a loss range of $10 billion to $25 billion, upped the damage window to between $40 billion and $60 billion by mid-September.
EQECAT increased its loss estimates from a range of $9 billion to $16 billion, to $14 billion to $22 billion, and finally from $26 billion to $43 billion. AIR Worldwide Corp. saw its estimates go from a range of $12 billion to $26 billion to $17 billion and $25 billion.
"I think this will also prompt another review of the reliability, of the modeling agencies," said Simon Marshall, a credit analyst with Standard & Poor's.
Some of the differences were also due to the companies excluding damage from flood. Whatever the ease, the differences added to the confusion and the uncertainty facing carriers and reinsurers.
Hemant Shah, CEO of the modeling firm RMS, admitted that it was "appropriate to be skeptical" about the catastrophe models, and said analysts and investors would need to "take a deep breath" when assessing the estimated losses incurred by a hurricane.
Models used to estimate New Orleans flood damage, for example, factored water coming in from the Mississippi or the storm surge created by the winds and tides in the Gulf of Mexico, said Shah. But the models didn't consider flooding from nearby Lake Ponchartrain, which dumped billions of gallons of water into the city after levees failed.
Executives with the broker Aon Re even went so far as to chide the industry for issuing irresponsible numbers reflecting Katrina's losses to the energy markets. Models predicting losses of $6 billion to $8 billion, when the real losses will be closer to $3.5 billion, do no service to clients, said Charley Cantlay, deputy chairman of Aon Re U.K.
Reinsurance executives, gathered in Monaco in September at the 49th Annual Rendez-Vous de Septembre, defended the release of loss estimates so early after the hurricane struck.
They blamed investors and ratings agencies for pressuring them to release loss estimates even though the industry executives believe it was irresponsible so early after a storm, particularly one like Katrina where the losses are complex.
Wilhelm Zeller, chairman of the executive board of Hannover Re, said his company was finally forced to issue a statement days after Munich Re and Swiss Re had made public their losses and agencies and investors were clamoring for information on the storm's impact on his company.
"There has been more immediate pressure from the ratings agencies to get a handle on the number than with any other event," Bill Adamson, head of the U.S. operations of Carvill, a reinsurance broker, was quoted as saying.

What is news? More precisely, when is news? Lately, the division has become starker between news that reports the details of past events, and "news" that is a forecast, a best guess, of the outcome of past events, or even of future events.
For some time, I have found fiction of increasingly little interest why should I care about made-up people, when real people have far more interesting lives and are, to boot, real? Much of what passes for "news" I find similarly uncompelling, because it is mere speculation. Worse by far, though, is the "news" that is speculation about speculation.
An example: A hurricane threatens--let's call it Cassandra. The TV news anchor, who has flown into the town most likely to be destroyed cuts to a guy in a sports coat with a computer screen. He is an "expert" on such matters, who confirms that when the storm hits in a couple of days, an apocalypse will ensue, with insured losses that will cause the collapse of insurance and reinsurance companies and disrupt shipping for generations.
When Cassandra takes a slight turn and misses the populated areas altogether, there's nary a change in anyone's routineHURRICANE KATRINA
As Hurricane Katrina approached New Orleans late in August, the catastrophe modeling agencies fell over each other to forecast the estimated cost of insured losses from a storm that had not yet hit anything. On Friday, Aug. 26, three days before Katrina made its second landfall, RMS forecast insured losses at $1 to $2 billion. AIR Worldwide's estimate that day was a maximum of $600 million. Guess who made the evening "news"?
On Sunday afternoon, RMS upped the ante: "greater than" and possibly "far more devastating than" $9 billion. Monday morning, as the storm hit, EQECAT forecast losses for U.S. insurers from Hurricane Katrina of $30 billion.
By Monday evening, Aug. 29, after the worst of things, estimates were "between $10 billion and $25 billion." The hurricane, in other words, followed a more or less predictable line, while the financial forecasts were all over the map.
What public service was fulfilled by these estimates? And why were they so wildly inaccurate? The only answer to the latter question is a losing proposition: hurricanes are erratic, and impossible to forecast with any accuracy, right up to and after the event. That being the ease, why issue speculative reports containing more hot air than the hurricane itself?
The agencies' forecasts were picked up by news organizations and parlayed into dire predictions of the washing-away of the city of New Orleans by a 28-foot tidal wave. RM8 provided a statistic: New Orleans had $40 billion of insured values, and the surrounding parishes some $110 billion.
The modeling agencies shouted "Fire!" in a crowded media room. The agencies have been very kind to me in terms of access in the past, but really, they must desist from this sort of behavior. The fact is that we really won't know the true losses for weeks, maybe months.
To all the instant experts, prognosticators, seers, pundits and other purveyors of opinion who masquerade as news analysts by forecasting, I would paraphrase Bambi's mother: "If you don't have anything factual to say, don't say anything at all."

"How do I become a model?" is a frequent question from ESSENCE readers. Answer: A pretty face and great legs aren't all you'll need to break into the biz. Our insiders' tips:
1. Learn the lingo. A manager at an agency introduces you to clients and helps steer your career in exchange for 20 percent of your earnings. Your book, or portfolio, shows you in a range of professional photos. A camp card is a flyer featuring several shots of you, your measurements and your agency's contact information. A casting, an open call or a go see is an appointment with a prospective client.
2. Study your look. "Spend time staring into the mirror," says Maiysha, a Ford model and official print-campaign girl for Lane Bryant. "Know what your face does when you make different expressions." Kyle Hagler, a modal manager at International Management Group (IMG), advises, "Do as many test shoots as possible, even if they're only snapshots." Critique your photos: What is your best pose? Your most flattering angle?
3. Find a good agency. Most major modeling agencies are based in New York with branches in large cities like Miami and Los Angeles. But many smaller cities have modeling or talent agencies. Send local agencies you r best snapshots and arrange an interview. Before you agree to be represented by an agency, do your research: Who are the models it represents? What kind of work do they get (newspaper circulars, local fashion shows)? Is the agency listed with the Better Business Bureau?
4. Beware of scams. No one should ask you to invest a lot of money in camp cards, portfolios or test shoots. A reputable agency that's serious about representing you will arrange for test shoots with some photographers willing to shoot you free of charge and sell you prints for a nominal fee, says Hagler. Or they'll advance you the money and deduct it from your first paycheck.
5. Understand the requirements. To model full-time, you must be able to work long hours (a shoot can last more than 12 hours), sometimes with little sleep. You must be determined, focused and in possession of extraordinary genes: Models are typically at least five feel nine inches tall and well proportioned (usually with hips and waist measurements that are approximately ten inches apart, such as 34-24-34). You'll also need flawless skin, straight teeth and symmetrical features.
6. Consider modeling school. "Schools can give you an advantage over others by teaching you how to walk, behave and dress," says Hagler. Ask if the school has an affiliation with a reputable agency. Find out how many working models the institution has graduated in the last two years. Check on consumer complaints with the Better Business Bureau.
7. Be persistent. You can't expect modeling jobs to come to you, says booker Sharon Elcock, who works with the New York management company Mode Squad, Inc. If you're just starting out, one approach is to contact the public-relations manager at your local mall and inquire about any in store fashion shows. Let your hairstylist know you're available for hair shows. If you live in New York City or can afford to travel there, call the fashion or beauty department of your favorite magazines and ask if they're planning any makeover stories. Indicate whether you're willing to cut or color your hair. If you're signed to an agency, "make sure they're aware of any talents you have--dancing, Rollerblading, acting. You never know what someone is looking for," says Elcock.
8. Develop a thick skin. "You're going to be turned down for being ton fat or too skinny, too ethnic or not ethnic enough," says Maiysha. Clients will critique your pictures and expect you to take it like a pro. "It's all about how the client envisions selling their product," Maiysha says. "It has nothing to do with you."
9. Don't be a diva. Jay Manuel, creative director-producer of shoots for UPN's America's Next Top Model, says, "Models are there to be molded by professionals who understand the industry. Don't arrive thinking you know more than they do."
10. Have a plan B, cautions Maiysha. Few modeling careers last longer than ten years. Seek financial advice, save money, and cultivate other marketable skills.

ABSTRACT:
Exposure models focusing on reach and frequency where an audience is exposed to an ad message are the foundation of audience measurement. Given that a certain fundamental assumption of conventional exposure models is not relevant in the Internet advertising context, this paper suggests that the audience's on-line banner exposure can be best analyzed by its Web site visits. The negative binomial distribution (NBD) model, having long been applied in analyzing repeat behaviors, is proposed to serve as a banner ad exposure model. An empirical validation indicates that the model performs well in both data fitting and prediction.
(ProQuest Information and Learning: ... denotes formulae omitted.)
As market players take a more realistic view of the Internet as a medium for advertising nowadays, an array of metrics has been introduced specifically for Internet advertising (Bhat, Bevans, and Sengupta 2002). However, given these Internetspecific metrics, at least in the nonproprietary domain, there is a dearth of modeling work shedding new light on how Internet advertising can be planned more objectively and efficiently. In comparison with conventional media, the Internet opens windows of opportunity for advertisers to track an audience's behaviors that were unimaginable before, but the issue of reach and frequency of banner advertising-how the audience is exposed to an on-line campaign-has not been rigorously addressed.
In terms of advertising media models for planning (Rust 1986), prior research studies proposed that models developed for conventional media can be satisfactorily applied to the Internet advertising context (e.g., Leckenby and Hong 1998)-in this we do not agree. Since the Internet audience's possible exposure to a given advertising message is no longer limited to the upper bound defined by a schedule in the conventional sense, we argue that exposure models developed on the assumption of message "insertion" cannot serve to describe, not to mention predict, the actual exposure of an Internet audience to on-line advertising. As detailed clickstream user-centric and/or site-centric data are currently available to advertisers, it is neither a scarcity of data nor the accuracy of record that is at issue in efficient on-line ad planning, but rather a lack of a simple but robust model that relevantly guides the measurement of on-line audiences for the sake of advertising planning. This paper proposes such a model for bannerlike ads
We actually borrow the development of the model from other marketing research contexts in which the model's applicability as well as its robustness has been long and widely demonstrated. As a simple model for the description and prediction of the Internet audience's extent of exposure to on-line campaigns, the model is expected to serve as a stepping-stone to future modeling efforts in this respect.
In the following, the background of both Internet advertising and related advertising media models is first briefly sketched. The problem of conventional exposure in the online context is then discussed. Thereafter, the proposed model is introduced, for which performance, characteristics, use, and limitations are also empirically investigated.
BACKGROUND
Banner Ads on the Internet
Banners, pop-up ads, pop-under ads, interstitials, and so forth, are current variants of popular Internet advertising. Given their growing acceptance by agencies and advertisers, however, there is an array of problems that have not yet been satisfactorily resolved. Among them, the most frequently mentioned are (1) confusion concerning the effectiveness of bannerlike Internet advertising, (2) confusion concerning appropriate pricing models for bannerlike Internet advertising, and (3) confusion concerning appropriate advertising metrics (Bush, Bush, and Harris 1998; Chatterjee, Hoffman, and Novak 2003; Drèze and Hussherr 2003; McDonald 1997; Shen 2002).
These issues are closely interrelated. Since practitioners hold different views as to how Internet advertising can be most effectively applied to their integrated marketing communication efforts, various metrics and consequential pricing models naturally coexist in the marketplace. The confusion actually results from Internet advertising's dual promise of one-toone targeting and global reach (Drèze and Hussherr 2003) or, to put it another way, from the dichotomy of Web marketing goals: direct response versus branding (Broussard 2000).
At the early stage of Internet advertising, compared with conventional media for advertising, the Internet was taken as a very different medium. People were inclined to highlight the interactiveness of the Internet (e.g., Ephron 1997). The belief that Internet advertising is unique and that interaction on-line is what Internet advertising is for makes click-through, the most obvious behavior that represents interaction between the audience and the advertiser, a frequently talked-about metric in gauging performances of on-line campaigns. During the course of Internet advertising growth, this emphasis on interactionrelated behaviors has gained a deeply rooted popularity in practice. In a survey of media directors of interactive advertising agencies, Shen (2002) found that a majority of the respondents still use click-through to measure the effectiveness of on-line advertising. An interesting but rather confusing finding from Shen (2002) is that in terms of pricing, more than 90% of the respondents frequently used conventional CPM (cost per thousand) to price banner ads, whereas only 33% of the respondents have a click-through rate as one of their pricing models.